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AbstrAct: the conventional readings of hegel’s theory of property show that property plays an 
important role in developing human individuality. in this paper, i repudiate the conventional 
readings and offer a new interpretation of hegel’s theory of property. i aim to show that hegel’s 
theory of property provides a vantage point for us to rethink the relationship between persons 
and the society in general and the nature of property in particular. situated in the whole picture 
of hegel’s social theory of freedom, i demonstrate that hegel sees property as a social institution 
that plays a crucial role in shaping human individuality as well as sociability. 
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introDuction
the conventional interpretations of hegel’s theory of property show that property plays 
an important role in developing human individuality through the person-to-thing rela-
tionship. in this paper, i seek to repudiate the conventional interpretations by demon-
strating that they are narrow-minded and unfaithful to hegel’s thought on property. i 
then offer a new interpretation of hegel’s theory of property. i aim to show that hegel’s 
property theory provides a vantage point for us to rethink the relationship between per-
sons and the society in general and the nature of property in particular. situated in the 
whole picture of hegel’s social theory of freedom, i demonstrate that hegel sees prop-
erty as a social institution that plays a crucial role in shaping human individuality as 
well as sociability. on the one hand, mediated by the institution of property, a person 
nurtures and develops individuality or personal freedom in the social world consisting 
of things and other persons. on the other hand, the institution of property facilitates 
the cultivation of sociability by helping human beings become members of our society. 
furthermore, social institutions in the hegelian ethical life act as the indispensable cata-
lyst for empowering property to spark the synergies between human individuality and 
sociability so as to actualize freedom for all human beings.  
i. the conventional interPretations of hegel’s ProPerty 
theory
A. The Embodiment Thesis and Person-To-Thing Relationship
central to the conventional interpretations of hegel’s property theory is the embodi-
ment thesis that is focused primarily on the way in which persons develop human indi-
viduality through their pure relations with things in their possession. to this end, some 
commentators argue that hegel justifies the legitimacy of property based on the necessi-
ty of individuals’ embodiment of their will into things. the act of embodying establishes 
the relationship between an individual and the thing in his possession. the mere form-
ing of this kind of relationship, in their view, is sufficient to lay the foundation for indi-
viduals to nurture and develop human individuality. Jeremy Waldron, for example, con-
cludes that ‘[t]he importance of property to individual wills [in hegel’s property theory] 
is this: the actions that an individual performs on or with this object now may constrain 
or determine the actions that he can perform on or with it later. this is how an object 
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can embody a will—by registering the effects of willing at one point of time and forcing 
an individual’s willing to become consistent and stable over a period’.2 similarly, J. e. 
Penner argues that hegel ‘explains property as a relation between persons and things 
which is essentially determined by the nature of persons and things, specifically by the 
fact that persons have wills and things do not’.3 moreover, margaret Jane radin’s pio-
neering work on personality theory of property that focuses on ‘personal embodiment 
or self-constitution in terms of ‘things’’4 draws on her individualist interpretation of the 
way in which hegel justifies the institution of property through the act of embodying 
individual will in things and the subsequent  creation of person-to-thing relations. 
B. Property, Individuality, and Personal Freedom
on the other hand, the conventional interpretations are preoccupied with analyzing 
how hegel explains the role of property in empowering human beings to become per-
sons or developing their own individualities. Put differently, hegel’s theory focuses on 
the role of property in fostering and promoting personal freedom. for example, alan 
Patten argues that ‘hegel elaborates and defends … a developmental thesis about the con-
nection between individual freedom and private property. according to this thesis, 
having at least a minimal amount of private property is essential to the development and 
maintenance of the capacities and self-understandings that make up free personality’.5 
similarly, some other scholars’ interpretations focus on the connection between the in-
stitution of property and the development of personal freedom.6
C. The Limitations of  the Conventional Interpretations
the core problem of the conventional interpretations of hegel’s property theory, in 
my opinion, stems from the interpretative methodology employed by the scholars who 
focus exclusively on the ‘abstract right’ chapter of hegel’s Philosophy of  Right dealing 
with the nurturing of human individuality or personal freedom.7 in this way, the con-
ventional interpretations were made without looking broadly at hegel’s social theory of 
freedom. for example, they barely discuss whether hegel considers the role of property 
in shaping human sociability and developing ethical life and human society at large. 
     2. Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property, oxford, oxford university Press, 1988, p.373. 
     3. J.e. Penner, The Idea of  Property in Law, oxford, oxford university Press, 1997, p.169. 
     4. margaret Jane radin, ‘Property and Personhood’, Stanford Law Review, vol. 34, 1982, pp.958.
     5. alan Patten, Hegel’s Idea of  Freedom, oxford, oxford university Press, 1999, p.140. 
     6. see, for example, Justin hughes, The Philosophy of  Intellectual Property, georgetown law Journal, vol. 77, 
1988, p.33 (‘in his property theory, however, hegel focused on the immediate freedom of an individual’.); 
J.W. harris, Property and Justice, oxford, oxford university Press, 1996, pp.230-237; renato cristi, Hegel 
on Freedom and Authority, cardiff: university of Wales Press, 2005, pp.76-90; allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical 
Thought, cambridge, cambridge university Press, 1990, pp.94-107.
     7. see, for example, thom brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of  the Philosophy of  Right, 
edinburgh, edinburgh university Press, 2007, p.37 (‘many commentators mistakenly hold that hegel’s 
complete views on property are contained in abstract right’.).
cosmos anD history36
some parts of the conventional interpretations even hold that hegel’s ‘individualistic’ 
thought on property cannot fit comfortably with, and may run counter to, his general 
theory of social freedom in ethical life. for example, preoccupied with examining the 
‘embodiment’ and ‘personal freedom’ theses of hegel’s theory, Jeremy Waldron points 
out that ‘hegel’s account of civil society [in ethical life] fits well, in many respects, with 
his account of the importance of private property’.8 
the isolated interpretative methodology employed by the conventional interpretations, 
therefore, results in the problem that hegel’s theory of property turns out to be very indi-
vidualistic and irreconcilable with his social theory of freedom which teaches that the self-
actualization of freedom requires a varied degree of reliance on otherness.9 hegel’s idea of 
freedom fundamentally differs from the liberal notion of freedom in that he ‘abandons the 
concept of freedom as independence when he stresses that the self must live through others 
and in the world’.10 as the embodiment of the independence from as well as dependence on 
otherness, freedom, in hegel’s view, can be only developed in social settings.
in this paper, i aim to repudiate the conventional interpretations and offer a new 
interpretation by situating hegel’s thought on property in the whole picture of his social 
theory of freedom. on the one hand, i re-examine the role of property in shaping 
human individuality based on his idea of externalization and internationalization of 
free will and further on his idea of mutual recognition. as i will show, my interpretation 
profoundly differs from the embodiment thesis and the focus on the person-to-thing re-
lationship that are prevalent in the conventional interpretations. on the other hand, i 
discuss the ways in which hegel considers the role of property in shaping human socia-
bility. to do so, i show how property contributes to improving the well-being of human 
beings as social members and achieving social recognition of such human identity. this 
part of my interpretation sheds new light on the social thesis embedded in hegel’s theory 
of property, to which the conventional interpretations turn a blind eye. furthermore, i 
explore how hegel designs the building blocks of the property system based upon his 
social theory of freedom, which is barely discussed in the conventional interpretations. 
ii. shaPing inDiviDuality: Private ProPerty anD the freeDom 
of being a Person
the overall task that hegel aims to accomplish in the Philosophy of  Right, as he points 
out at the very beginning of this book, is to examine the concept of freedom and how it 
can be actualized.11 hegel sees the actualization of freedom as a historical process that 
     8. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, p.374. 
     9. Pm §382a (‘but the freedom of mind is not merely an independence of the other won outside the 
other, but won within the other; it attains actuality not by fleeing from the other but by overcoming it’.); 
Pr §7a. see also, Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, pp.44-49; frederick neuhouser, Foundations of  Hegel’s Social 
Theory, cambridge, harvard university Press, 2000, pp. 19-20; michael o. hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philoso-
phy: The Project of  Reconciliation, cambridge, cambridge university Press, 1994, p.114.
     10. frederick beiser, Hegel, london: routledge, 2005, p.202. 
     11. Pr § 1 (‘the subject-matter of the philosophical science of  right is the Idea of  right—concept of right and its 
actualization’). 
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entails different stages of human and social developments.12 one stage of such develop-
ment deals with the freedom of being a person, namely personal freedom. in this realm 
of development, human individuality flourishes and personal freedom develops through 
the interactions between the individual and the thing, and further among individuals 
with the exclusive possession of things. 
A. Externalization and Internalization of  Free Will  
to be a person, one must, as hegel points out, posit oneself in a way that is different 
from others. the determinations of interpersonal differences largely stem from the ways 
in which each person makes a multitude of varied choices to satisfy their own natural 
drives, desires, and inclinations. according to hegel, having an external sphere of free-
dom is indispensable for actualizing the personal choice-making process. ‘the person 
must give himself an external sphere of  freedom in order to have being as idea’.13 this is 
because an external sphere provides the space within which one is left free to choose the 
individualized ways to satisfy his natural drives, desires, and inclinations. in doing so, 
one gradually develops his own distinctive contents and form of individuality.
for hegel, things like land, stones, and animals have no free will. they are by 
nature external not only to themselves but to all human beings.14 therefore, a thing 
naturally constitutes the external sphere a person can take control of for making his own 
choices. in this context, a person can manifest his supremacy over a thing by placing his 
individual will in it: 
a person has the right to place his will in any thing. the thing thereby becomes 
mine and acquires my will as its substantial end (since it has no such end within 
itself), its determination, and its soul—the absolute right of appropriation which 
human beings have over all things.15 
the act of placing human will in a thing, as hegel observes above, would amount to a 
person’s exclusive control over it. this is because he sees the act of placing one’s individ-
ual will in a thing as a means to the end of developing individuality or personal freedom. 
for hegel, the reasons for this are twofold. 
on the one hand, hegel thinks that a person can achieve the assertion of the self-
consciousness of being free by going through a judgment-making process for himself as to 
whether and how he should place his individual will in a particular thing. there are, as 
hegel points out, three means by which taking possession of things can be accomplished 
by the act of placing of the will, and each of the means involves the individualized judg-
ment-making process.16 first, one’s physical seizure of a thing enables him to create a con-
     12. Pr §§ 3 & 3a; vPr 17 § 8 (‘right has manifold stages…’.).
     13. Pr §41. 
     14. Pr §§42-43; vPr 17 §15.
     15. Pr §44. see also, Pm §489 (‘the predicate of mine, which the thing obtains through the judgment of 
possession initially in the external appropriation, is for itself merely practical, but here it has the meaning 
that i put my personal will into the thing’.); vPr 17 §16.
     16. Pr §54.
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nection with the thing concerned, because he is ‘immediately present in this possession 
and his will thus also discernible in it’.17 second, one can also give form to things in order 
to shape their characters based upon his personal knowledge and volition.18 this way of 
taking possession of things may include cultivating land, building a windmill, or training 
animals.19 thirdly, one can designate ownership of things by putting his mark on them, for 
instance, building a fence outside his house.20 all these forms of taking possession of things 
are carried out by a person for himself as he sees fit. he decides to do it simply for his own 
purposes based upon his desires, preferences, and inclinations.21 in doing so, he makes a 
judgment for himself by deciding whether he should put his will in a thing and thereby 
take possession of it. the more judgments of this kind he makes for himself, the more he 
knows about his own free will as manifested by taking possession of things. hence the 
judgment-making process of this type is the most direct self-assertion and self-positing of 
one’s consciousness of being a free person. as hegel observes, ‘possession becomes prop-
erty insofar as the i who possess it is a free will that wills to possess it. thus in property my 
will has become objective to me. in property my will has determinate existence, and this 
determinate existence of the will must be respected. mere possession is not to be respect-
ed, but my free will, that has placed the predicate ‘mine’ in a thing, constitutes possession 
as property. With this assertion of right begins, for right is freedom as such’.22 
on the other hand, hegel holds that a person’s taking possession of things through 
placing his will in them empowers himself to reinforce the self-consciousness of his status 
as a free being. as hegel observes, ‘the circumstance that i, as free will, am an object 
to myself in what i possess and only become an actual will by this means constitute the 
genuine and rightful element in possession … ‘.23 in this sense, the thing that i possess 
acts as a mirror in which i can perceive the existence of my own free will. because i put 
my will in the thing i possess, i can treat the thing as an integral part of my free will and 
further my image as being a free will.24 i take possession of things and at the same time 
they mirror back my free will to me. thereby, i become aware that i, as a free being, 
am an object to myself and i am definitely no longer an alien to my own self, because i 
realize that i am the possessor of my own free will that is put in the thing. in this regard, 
     17. Pr §55.
     18. Pr §56.
     19. Pr §§ 56 &56 a.
     20. Pr §58.
     21. Pr §45 (‘to have even external power over something constitutes possession, just as the particular 
circumstance that i make something my own out of natural need, drive and arbitrary will is the particu-
lar interests of possession’.); g. W. f. hegel, Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie Karl-heinz ilting (ed.), vol. 4, 
stuttgart-bad cannstatt, frommann-holzboog, 1973, §4:186 (‘a possession means that i have something in 
my external power, even if that something is natural. Possession hangs together with my needs, drives, and 
special interests. i possess something because i need to have it…’.).
     22. hegel, Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie. 
     23. Pr §45.
     24. Pr §4a (‘When i think of an object, i make it into a thought and deprive it of its sensuous quality; i 
make it into something which is essentially and immediately mine. for it is only when i think that i am with 
myself, and it is only comprehending it that i can penetrate an object, it then no longer stands opposed to 
me, and i have deprived it of that quality of its own which it had for itself in opposition to me’.). 
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hegel points out that ‘i look at myself in my property’ and thereby in property ‘i regard 
myself as free’.25 With the recurring experience of taking possession of things, a person is 
thereby empowered to continuously develop and promote the self-understanding of his 
status as ‘a willing and truly affirmative agent’.26
as shown above, a person’s individual will, in fact, goes through a two-way proc-
ess of movement through the act of taking possession of things: the externalization and 
subsequent internalization of free will.27 by externalizing individual will into things, a 
person obtains an external sphere that is necessary to the self-assertion of his conscious-
ness of being free and development of his individuality. by subsequently internalizing 
the individual will mirrored back by the thing in his possession, he further reinforces his 
consciousness of being free. 
in addition to the act of taking possession of things, the process of externalizing and 
internalizing free will is further deepened by a person’s making choices to use or alien-
ate the things in his possession. since i am in control of a thing, i can satisfy my need 
through ‘the alteration, destruction, or consumption of the thing’.28 in doing so, i con-
tinue to place my individual will in the thing through the process of making a choice as 
to whether and how i should use the thing. if i make the whole use of a thing, my indi-
vidual will would fully penetrate the thing.29 in this context, it means that i internalize 
my will in the thing and externalize my will out of it to the fullest extent possible. on the 
other hand, the thing is negated by me because it ‘is reduced to a means of satisfying my 
need’.30 in this process, i look at the thing to the fullest extent possible, the thing mirror 
back my will to the fullest extent possible as well, and therefore i internalize my will to 
the fullest extent possible. given that i make the externalization and internalization of 
my will to the fullest extent, i presumptively become the sole owner of thing31 and my 
‘[o]wnership is therefore essentially free and complete ownership’.32  
moreover, hegel holds that persons are at liberty to alienate their properties. things 
are by nature selfless and have no will. i am at liberty to place my will in a thing as a way 
to manifest my supremacy over it. as long as the thing is external to me,33 i am also at 
liberty to withdraw my will from a thing i possess as a way to manifest my supremacy 
over it. i am at liberty to withdraw my will by simply abandoning the thing or allowing 
another person to internalize his will in it. in this way, i demonstrate to my own self that 
i am indeed the master of things in my possession, and i can treat them in any way at 
     25. g. W. f. hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts: die Mitschriften Wannenmann (Heidelberg 1817/18) und Homeyer 
(Berlin 1818/19), Karl-heinz ilting (ed.),  Klett-cotta, 1983, 224 & 225. 
     26. Pr §59 a.
     27. vPr 17 §16 (‘though possession, on the one hand, i become external… ‘.).
     28. Pr §59.
     29. Pr §62 (‘if the whole extent of the use of a thing were mine, … the thing as mine would be wholly 
penetrated by my will… ‘.). see also, Pr §61.
     30. Pr §59a.
     31. Pr §61 (‘if i have the whole use of the thing, i am its owner; and beyond the whole extent of its use, 
nothing remains of the thing which could be the property of someone else’.).
     32. Pr §62.
     33. Pr §65.
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my disposal.34 the liberty to alienate things, therefore, is the best way to show that i am 
in full possession of the thing. i will to alienate my property entirely based on my own 
choice and i then entirely withdraw the will i placed in the thing concerned. hence, my 
alienation of a thing indicates that i decide to stop externalizing my will and to entirely 
internalize back all the will i have externalized in it. 
B. Mutual Recognition of  the Abstract Identity as Persons 
as shown above, hegel sees taking possession of things by externalizing will in them 
as the condition for a person to acquire property. through the interaction between in-
dividual will and things in the act of taking possession, using, or alienating, a person 
obtains the external sphere of personal freedom. this external sphere is by nature pri-
vate and exclusively belongs to an individual as the possessor of the thing concerned. 
interestingly, in addition to this condition, hegel adds a second condition of acquiring 
property by requiring that one’s ownership of a thing must be recognized by others. he 
explains this point as follows:
my inner idea and will that something should be mine is not enough to constitute 
property, which is the existence of personality; on the contrary, this requires that i 
should take possession of it. the existence which my will thereby attains includes its 
ability to be recognized by others.35
this passage shows that, while property rights can be asserted and exercised by per-
sons through their acts of taking possession of things, they are not fully actualized in 
the social world unless recognized by others. in the Philosophy of  Right, hegel empha-
sizes this point: ‘the concept of property requires that a person should place his will 
in a thing, and the next state is precisely the realization of this concept. my inner act 
of will which says that something is mine must also become recognizable by others’.36 
the recognition of property rights, as hegel points out, is mutually and reciprocally 
achieved in a way to fulfill the second part of the imperative set out by him for the 
commandment of property right: ‘be a person and respect others as person.s’37 this two-part 
imperative can only be realized as a whole, and each part should be fulfilled simultane-
ously. With the exclusive control over certain things, one will to be a free person with 
his own distinctive individuality (to be a person). yet hegel thinks that one’s personal 
freedom needs to be recognized by others. Without this kind of recognition, personal 
freedom is, in fact, not realizable in the social world.  since property constitutes a per-
son’s external sphere of personal freedom, the recognition of his control over property 
from others is the way in which he is recognized and respected as a free person. in reci-
procity, he recognizes others’ control over their properties and thereby recognizes and 
respects others as persons as well. in hegel’s earlier works, he repeatedly emphasizes 
     34. Pr §65a (pointing out that ‘alienation is regarded as a true mode of taking possession’).
     35. Pr §51.
     36. Pr §51.
     37. Pr §36.
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the requirement of mutual recognition when he talks about property. for example, he 
points out that ‘taking possession is the empirical act of seizure, and this is to be jus-
tified through recognition. it is not justified merely by virtue of its having occurred’.38 
moreover, he even concludes that ‘the essential being of ownership is the determinate ex-
istence of its right-governed absolute aspect, namely that in ownership persons recognize 
one another as persons’.39
thus, it is clear that hegel sees mutual recognition of property rights as an indis-
pensable step to actualizing personal freedom.40 he succinctly encapsulates the reasons 
for the need of mutual recognition and how persons can achieve mutual recognition of 
ownership in Philosophy of  Mind:
in property the person is joined together with himself. but the thing is an abstractly 
external thing, and the i in it is abstractly external. the concrete return of me into 
myself in the externality is this: i, the infinite relation me to myself, am as a person 
the repulsion of me from myself, and have the embodiment of my personality 
in the being of  other persons, in my relation to them and in recognition of by them, 
which is thus reciprocal.41
to understand this passage, we must read it together with what hegel writes in Phe-
nomenology of  Spirit and Philosophy of  Mind with respect to his theory of mutual recogni-
tion. for hegel, a human being cannot achieve a full self-consciousness of being a free 
person and actualize personal freedom if he relies only on things in his possession and 
the external sphere afforded by them. by internalizing or externalizing his will, a person 
takes possession of an object and subsequently uses or alienates it. by doing so, he makes 
choices as to whether and how he may interact with the selfless object. his making of 
choices, however, is based upon his natural desires for food, water, safety, etc. against 
this backdrop, his self-consciousness of being free, in fact, hinges upon the satisfaction 
of natural desires through his sole relationship with that object in his possession. yet the 
person still faces the need to satisfy the endless waves of potential desires, and the sat-
isfaction derived from a single external object is by no means sufficient to respond to 
the successive waves of desires. for this reason, his preoccupation with the ebb and flow 
of his desires keeps him revolving around selfless and impersonal objects. he would, in 
this context, run the risk of ‘yielding [himself] to the incessant renewal of desire’42 to 
obtaining external objects. rather than achieving the self-consciousness of being a free 
person, he may well lose his independence and then become a ‘slave’ of selfless things 
or his desires of possession due to his relentless reliance upon things to satisfy his desires. 
this endangers the actualization of his personal freedom. 
     38. g. W. f. hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of  The Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of  Spirit, trans. 
leo rauch, Detroit, Wayne state university Press, 1983, p.112.
     39. vPr 17 §31.
     40. Pr §51 (‘the concept of property requires that a person should place his will in a thing, and the next 
state is precisely the realization of this concept. my inner act of will which says that something is mine must 
also become recognizable by others’.)
     41. Pm §490. 
     42. Pm §428r.
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in addition, even if a person does not succumb to the endless desires of possession, he 
still faces a critical problem in fostering the self-consciousness of being a free person only 
through non-human objects. given that they have no will of being free, non-human ob-
jects merely contribute to one’s sense of self-worth secondarily or indirectly. What is con-
firmed and then mirrored back by them is an image of a person’s independence from the 
selfless and unfree objects that are by nature inferior to human beings. as allen Wood 
insightfully observes, ‘even animals, which are living and conscious objects, cannot pro-
vide me directly with a sense of my self-worth, since they possess no conception of a free 
self, and so i can never find in them a confirming perspective on myself ’.43 
since the self-consciousness of being a free person is not fully achievable by a per-
son’s sole reliance on an external object, or in other words, a non-i, a person has to seek 
recourse to ‘another i’,44 another person with free will. the only ‘another i’ that can form 
a full consciousness of being free is another free human being. gadamer puts this point 
exceptionally clearly: ‘if self-consciousness is to become true self-consciousness, then it 
must … find another self-consciousness that is willing to be ‘for it’.’45 indeed, hegel him-
self explicitly points out that ‘self consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the 
fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged’.46 
hence, the self-consciousness of being a free person reaches its second stage of de-
velopment, in which ‘the objective i acquires the determination of another I, and hence 
arises the relationship of one self-consciousness to another self-consciousness’.47 at this 
stage, my self-consciousness is recognized by another self-consciousness in a sense that 
i can perceive my free selfhood reflected back to me out of another self. both self-con-
sciousnesses (persons) seek to satisfy natural desires, and they achieve it by mutually 
confirming each other’s self-understanding as free beings. in doing so, each self-con-
sciousness must ‘come out of  itself’48 and each must give back the recognition it receives 
from the other. this is the process of recognition in which two persons are mutually en-
gaged as ‘the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses’.49 both persons simulta-
neously act as the one being recognized as well the one recognizing. 
With respect to property, two persons are mutually engaged in the process of rec-
ognition as the owners of objects. each person recognizes the object(s) possessed by the 
other as the external sphere of personal freedom. hegel further points out that ‘my ex-
isting determinately in my ownership is a relationship to other persons, and from this 
stems reciprocal recognition: the free is for the free. since i know myself to be free, i 
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know myself to be universal and know others to be free; and since i know others to be 
free, i know myself to be free. the principle of right accordingly [runs]: respect your-
self and others in their ownership as persons’.50 
With the culmination of mutual recognition, universal self-consciousness of being 
free begins to take shape in a property-owning society.51 in the process of mutual rec-
ognition, one wins freedom for himself not by subjugating the other but only by lib-
erating him, granting him the same free status as he claims for himself, namely an 
owner of the things in his possession. given that it is achieved by two property owners 
on a reciprocal basis, the process of mutual recognition would ripple through the soci-
ety as a whole as more and more reciprocal parties became involved. in the property-
owning society, every person therefore is intersubjectively recognized by others as a 
property owner. 
We can gain a deeper understanding of hegel’s argument for property and personal 
freedom from the perspective of his master-slave dialectic. hegel holds that a slave can 
foster his self-consciousness of being a free person by working on objects. ‘through 
work, … the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is… . [i]n fashioning the 
thing, he becomes aware that being-for-itself belongs to him, that he himself exists es-
sentially and actually in his own right’. such self-consciousness is fostered among slaves 
because they undergo the externalizing-and-internalizing-of-their-will process through 
working on things (e.g., giving forms to or using things). yet it does not follow that slaves 
can fully develop their personal freedom. this is because their possession of objects 
through work is in fact not recognized by the masters who simply treat the slave as their 
selfless objects. yet for the masters as well, their ownership of the objects cannot be rec-
ognized by slaves, for the latter are treated by the former as selfless objects rather than 
persons with the self-consciousness of being free. as shown above, mutual recognition is 
secured between two equal persons. since slaves are not recognized as persons with the 
self-consciousness of being free, they are not able to recognize their master’s self-con-
sciousness of being free and further his ownership control over objects in his possession. 
the master-slave dialectic teaches that the mere act of taking possession of things 
cannot lead to a fully developed self-consciousness of being free and the legitimation 
of proprietary control over things. the intersubjectivity of mutual recognition, on the 
other hand, adds a second dimension to the role of property in building personal free-
dom: every person promotes the actualization of the self-consciousness of being a free 
person through being recognized by others as property owners. ‘a person, in distin-
guishing himself from himself, relates himself to another person, and indeed it is only 
as owners of property that the two have existence for each other’.52 in this sense, the 
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property right is not ‘actual or objective until it is recognized’53 and therefore mutual 
recognition of property is of critical importance to the actualization of personal free-
dom. to recognize a person as a free being is in fact to recognize the person as free in 
relation to the things in his proprietary control that constitute the external sphere of 
personal freedom. in hegel’s view, since the legitimacy of property rights entails the 
intersubjectivity of mutual recognition, a property-owing society therefore must elimi-
nate the slavery system that erects insurmountable hurdles for realizing mutual recog-
nition of personal freedom. 
in short, by going through externalizing and internalizing of free will, and mutual 
recognition, the two major processes discussed in this section, a person is empowered 
to become the master of the self or the individual free will, for by doing so he has fully 
actualized the self-consciousness of being a free person. given the pivotal importance of 
having property to actualizing personal freedom, hegel boldly states ‘everyone ought to 
have property’54 and persons have the ‘duty to possess things as property’.55
iii. shaPing sociability: Private ProPerty anD the freeDom 
of being a social member 
A. Social Membership of  Ethical Life
in the preceding section, i discussed the way in which hegel explores the role of prop-
erty in developing personal freedom and shaping human individuality. in this realm 
of hegel’s theory, property owners are seen as persons with private right in the things 
they possess. yet being a person is by no means the only identity that the property 
owner can take on. the identities of human beings, according to hegel, vary at the 
different stages of human and social development. When human development pro-
ceeds to the stage of ethical life that consists of the institutions of the family, civil soci-
ety, and the state as ‘the unity of … the will of the individual’,56 human beings partake 
of another identity as social members. as hegel points out, ‘in right, the object is the 
person; at the level of morality, it is the subject, in the family, the family-member, and in 
civil society in general, the citizen’.57 therefore, in the stage of ethical life, individuals 
as property owners simultaneously take on social roles as members of the family, civil 
society, and the state.58 
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to be sure, this transformation of human identity begs the question of why individ-
uals as property owners must see themselves as social members of ethical life. human 
beings need the external spheres to develop individuality, and therefore protection of 
property is of critical importance to promoting personal freedom. yet hegel points out 
that personal freedom ‘cannot exist independently’ and ‘must have the ethical as their 
support and foundation’. ‘right exists only as a branch of a whole, or as a climbing plant 
attached to a tree which has firm roots in and for itself ’.59 for hegel, the actualization of 
personal freedom is to be socially conditioned, and human beings act as interdependent 
members of ethical life in a social setting. the social condition of the personal freedom 
realized in ethical life has two dimensions: the external and internal ethical orders. these 
two ethical orders make it necessary for individuals to develop their social membership 
when they pursue their own projects of promoting and protecting personal freedom. 
on the one hand, social institutions of ethical life form the external condition for de-
veloping personal freedom through the creation of an ethical order of security and sta-
bility. compared to the stage of abstract right in which personal freedom is achieved by 
the action guided by individual will, ethical life paves the way for developing social well-
being so as to facilitate the realization of personal freedom for all. in the ethical totality 
of a society, social institutions are established to promote and protect individual rights as 
well as the common good. to this end, the creation of social institutions brings about an 
ethical order in a rational way. the rationality of social order is by nature imbued with 
‘a fixed content … exalted above subjective opinions and preferences [of individuals]’.60 
therefore, social institutions in general and laws promulgated by the state in particu-
lar create a set of norms with which individuals must comply so as to develop personal 
freedom collectively in a society. in this way, the ethical order generates a secure and 
stable environment for developing personal freedom. ‘the fact that the ethical sphere 
is the system of [norms] constitutes rationality. in this way, the ethical sphere is freedom, 
or the will which has being in and for itself as objectivity, as a circle of necessity whose 
moments are the ethical powers which govern the lives of individuals’.61 
on the other hand, ethical life brings about the internal ethical order of developing 
personal freedom. in the stage of pure developing of personal freedom, what human 
beings achieve is the realization of the self-consciousness of being free. as mere per-
sons, human beings are apt to claim that personal freedom enables them to do what-
ever they want to do within or even outside of the external spheres that are in their 
possession. for hegel, this is the primitive stage of actualizing freedom in that human 
beings still lack an adequate degree of rationality. hegel expressly repudiates this sort 
of claim by stating that ‘When we hear it said that freedom in general consists in being 
able to do as one pleases, such an idea can only be taken to indicate a complete lack of 
intellectual culture’.62 freedom, in hegel’s view, necessarily entails the requirement that 
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human beings make rational choices on a par with the ethical substance of the social 
whole. therefore, he states that ‘When i will what is rational, i act not as a particular 
individual, but in accordance with the concepts of ethics in general: in an ethical act…. 
the rational is the high road which everyone follows and where no one stands out 
from the rest’.63 human rationality, however, is by no means formed naturally. accord-
ing to hegel, education (Bildung) plays a pivotal role in shaping human rationality, for 
the end of education is to cultivate persons with the thinking capabilities that ‘regulate 
one’s will according to a universal [principle]’.64 such capabilities have formative func-
tions in equipping individuals with an internal ethical order that shows them the ways 
in which they can reconcile their personal freedom with the external ethical order.65 
the creation of such an internal ethical order, hegel observes, is by nature a socially 
conditioned process. he encapsulates the relationship between education and socially 
formed human rationality in this way:
the human being who is rational in himself must work through the process of self-
production both by going out of himself and by education himself inwardly, in 
order that he may also become rational for himself.66 
to become rational through education, individuals must acquaint themselves with the 
major elements of the external ethical order and incorporate them as their inner guid-
ance for their behavior.67 these elements may include the law, customs, and traditions 
in ethical life.68 moreover, individuals rationalize themselves through their social, cul-
tural, and political experiences as members of the family, civil society, and the state.
in short, ethical life, as hegel shows, is to be created and developed in ways that 
spark the synergy between the rationality of ethical order and the actualization of per-
sonal freedom. to this end, ethical life as the highest stage of human and social develop-
ment constitutes an interpenetrating unity of objective freedom and subjective freedom.69 
this is because the rationality of ethical order promotes ‘the ability of individuals both to 
endorse laws and practices that promote the collective good and to find their own par-
ticular identities through their social participation’.70 by becoming social members, indi-
viduals are deeply ingrained in their externally and internally rational ethical order so as 
to fully develop their personal freedom. their social embeddedness shows that the devel-
opment of social membership and the promotion of individuality can be cross-fertilized 
and is in fact interconstitutive. as hegel concludes, ‘the right of  individuals to their subjec-
tive determination to freedom is fulfilled in so far as they belong to the ethical actuality; for 
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their certainty of their own freedom has its truth in such objectivity, and it is in the ethical 
realm that they actually possess their own essence and their inner universality’.71
B. Private Property and Social Membership 
the significance of social membership in human development begs the question as to 
what role property may play in making individuals become the members of ethical life. 
according to hegel, property generally plays a dual role in shaping social member-
ship. on the one hand, it lays the foundation for social members to promote their own 
well-being. on the other hand, it facilitates social recognition of concrete identities that 
belong to social members. 
1. the Well-being of social members 
the family, civil society, and the state are the three constitutive parts of the hegelian 
ethical life. hegel discusses the ways in which property can be used to promote the well-
being of social members in the family, civil society, and the state.
a. the family 
for hegel, the family is the locus in which individuals forge a special relationship based 
upon love; its members are the husband, the wife, and their children. they work in 
tandem on a variety of mutual tasks like food preparation, child rearing, and family en-
tertainment. to do so, family members need things like food, water, housing, and so on. 
Property is crucial to sustaining and enhancing family relationships because it provides 
the resources on which members of the family draw to accomplish the joint effort of 
living together and enjoying life. accordingly, hegel infers that ‘the family, as a person, 
has its external reality in property; and only in the latter, in the shape of resources, does 
its substantial personality have its existence’.72 
family resources are by nature common property to all family members. they are 
obtained, used, and alienated for the family as a whole. however, property as a family re-
source still remains private in character and thereby has the power of excluding those who 
are not members of a particular family. Property in the domain of the family, therefore, 
is imbued with two characters. it is communal for the family members concerned, and it 
fosters and promotes the familial relationship in which they are united with a mutual spirit 
of sharing. on the other hand, it is also private in nature, since the family members need 
to have this private sphere capable of preserving the intimacy of family life. 
b. civil society 
compared to the family, civil society is by nature a marketplace in which its members 
are involved in various economic relationships in order to satisfy their personal 
needs. members of civil society are recognized as private persons. they have their 
own individual needs and ways to satisfy them. these individual needs are multiplied 
     71. Pr §196.
     72. Pr§169.
cosmos anD history48
and divided into more particularized concrete needs, and so are the ways to satisfy 
these particular human needs.73 With the proliferation of human needs and the ways 
of satisfying them, private persons are no longer able to work individually in order 
to satisfy their needs. rather, they are engaged in the network of social production 
and trade of a vast range of goods in the marketplace. social production and market-
based trade involve the division of labor. Private persons work in the sectors of their 
specializations.74 the products of their work are traded in the marketplace and thereby 
each private person can obtain a variety of products to satisfy their individualized needs. 
in this sense, private persons as members of civil society are actually situated in the 
social network of production and tradethe property system plays an important role in 
mediating the process of social work for mass production and trade in the marketplace. 
essentially, it forms the transactional basis of the marketplace in which contractual re-
lationships are indispensable to sustaining the flow of trade. as hegel points out, any 
contracts presuppose that the contractual parties are property owners because contracts 
are by nature ‘the mediation of the will to give up a property (an individual property) 
and the will to accept such a property (and hence the property of someone else)’.75 on 
the other hand, thanks to its communicative function, property facilitates the forming 
of contractual relationships in the marketplace. in civil society, property comes to have 
formalities as the proof of the validity of ownership, and thereby the titles become clear 
in the marketplace.76 the trading parties are therefore in a better position to get to know 
the relevant information about the products that are to be exchanged. 
c. the state
hegel sees the state as the highest sphere of ethical life. ‘since the state is objective spirit, 
it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, 
truth, and ethical life’.77 hegel’s view of the nature of the state is sharply different from that 
of social contract theory which holds that the state is formed by commonality of individual 
wills. according to hegel, persons become citizens of the state simply because they have 
the duty to do so rather than that they choose to do so.78 however, persons have the free-
dom to develop their own individualities and to pursue their own life plans. this is be-
cause the progress of the state development cannot be achieved without personal knowl-
edge and volition of the particular individuals who are supposed to engage themselves in 
different aspects of cultural and political life. therefore, hegel points out that the very 
dynamics of the state ‘consists in the unity of its universal and ultimate end with particular 
interest of individuals, in the fact they have duties toward the state to the same extent as 
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they also have rights’.79 this unitary status indicates that the relationship between the state 
and its citizens is by nature reciprocal. While citizens have the duty to become members of 
the state, the state has the duty to maintain a stable social environment in a manner con-
ducive to the promotion and protection of personal freedom of citizens. 
on the one hand, the use of property can become an important way of delivering 
citizens’ duties to the state. Property protection incentivizes men to actively participate 
in social and political life and thereby develop political virtue. this positive role played 
by property has been expounded by the forerunners of republicanism. for example, 
they thought that ‘ownership of property provides the necessary foundation for virtue, 
enabling citizens to pursue the common welfare’.80 citizens also need to perform serv-
ices for the state. hegel points out that the state service can be ‘expressed in terms of 
money’.81 it can largely be served in the form of one’s paying taxes to the state, and taxes 
are paid by citizens by using their own property. 
on the other hand, individuals as the citizens of the state receive legal protection 
of their civil rights, which is the most important way to promote and protect their per-
sonal freedom. Property is one of the most important civil rights protected by the state. 
sufficient protection of property is afforded by the state, given the reciprocal relation-
ship with the state and its citizens that was shown above. yet this reciprocal relationship 
denotes that it is citizens’ membership in the state that entitles them to enjoy the legal 
protection of property provided by the state. if citizens refuse to become members of the 
state or withdraw their membership, they would lose their entitlement to state protec-
tion of their property. the next section of paper will discuss in detail the ways in which 
the state provides adequate protection of property rights.   
2. social recognition of the concrete identity as social members
as shown in section ii.b, the upshot of mutual recognition in the stage of personal free-
dom is that human beings partake of an abstract identity as free persons with property 
rights. this means that persons are, to some extent, indistinguishable from all others 
because they are all recognized as purely property owners.82 by contrast, mutual recog-
nition in the stage of ethical life opens a new chapter of human development: human 
beings as social members come to be recognized as having concrete identities. they 
have concrete identities in the sense that they are socially recognized as being fully as-
similated into ethical life. for example, in the family, persons act as fathers, mothers, or 
children; in civil society, persons act as workers, traders, or teachers, among other roles; 
in the state, persons primarily act as citizens. these are their concrete social roles played 
by persons as members of ethical life. 
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social recognition of the concrete identity is accomplished by members of ethical 
life largely through fostering and developing the sense of trust among them. hegel re-
gards trust as the ‘ethical disposition’. generally, he thinks that trust is nourished among 
social members in two interlinked ways: first, individuals must be aware of ‘the sub-
stance and … identity of all their interests with the whole’;83 and second, the other indi-
viduals ‘are actual and reciprocally aware of themselves’ in the same way. to this end, 
individuals, first of all, must give up the conception of themselves as mere independent 
and self-sufficient persons. for example, hegel points out that the recognition of con-
crete identities in the family starts from the first moment of love in which an individual 
does ‘not wish to be an independent person in [his] own right and that, if [he] were, [he] 
would feel deficient and incomplete’.84 in the state, an individual is supposed to become 
fully aware that his ‘substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in 
the interest and the end of an other’.85 second, to be recognized by others as a social 
member, an individual must realize that his carrying out other-regarding activities has 
intrinsic value to the development of his social membership. to do so, he needs to con-
stantly embrace a sufficient degree of self-reference to the well-being of others. in ethi-
cal life, as hegel observes, ‘we are not one-sidedly within ourselves, but willingly limit 
ourselves with reference to an other, even while knowing ourselves in this limitation as 
ourselves’.86 thirdly, reciprocity is crucial to maintaining trust among social members. 
this is because an individual’s being part of the social whole is premised on the expec-
tation that every other individual would do the same and keep following up. Without a 
sufficient degree of reciprocity at a social scale, individuals would lack the momentum 
to transform themselves into social members. 
What role can property play in fostering and promoting the trust-based social rec-
ognition in the ethical life? as far as i know, hegel does not explicitly discuss this issue. 
but we can find clues in this statement: 
What predominates in the state is the spirit of the people, custom, and law. there 
man is recognized and treated as a rational being, as free, as a person; and the 
individual, on his side, makes himself worthy of this recognition by overcoming 
the naturalness of his self-consciousness and obeying a universal, the will that is in 
and for itself, the law; he thus behaves toward others in a manner that is universally 
valid, recognizing them—as he wishes others to regard him—as free, as persons.87
according to this passage, hegel first emphasizes that every social member must have 
their own individuality and personal freedom. in other words, one is supposed to be 
recognized as a free person when he develops his social membership. the inseparabil-
ity of individuality and sociability, therefore, indicates that the social recognition of con-
crete identity is attainable under the circumstance in which human beings accomplish 
the mutual recognition of their abstract identity as free persons. as was shown in the 
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preceding section of this paper, property acts as an indispensable step for human beings 
to be recognized as free persons. therefore, having property can be seen as one of the 
fundamental human conditions under which persons as members of ethical life are em-
powered to achieve social recognition of their concrete identities. 
on the other hand, as the passage above shows, hegel points out that to be rec-
ognized as a social member rather than a purely independent person, one must show 
to others his acceptance of the ethical substance as intrinsic to his own interest in the 
sense that he is willing to forgo his private ends when the good of the social whole 
requires it. in doing so, one also show to others his readiness to overcome the one-
sidedness of being a mere person and furthermore his sense of the other-regarding 
virtue. to this end, one can capitalize on property as the medium for showing others 
his willingness to join social membership and to obey the rule of reciprocity. the vol-
untary limiting of personal freedom in using property becomes a direct way to show 
the individual’s willingness to become a social member. Property, as shown in sec-
tion ii.a, constitutes the external sphere of personal freedom. therefore, property is 
intimately linked to each individual’s personal interests. at the same time, it is easy 
for others to perceive the existence of property as an individual’s external sphere of 
personal freedom. accordingly, one’s readiness to impose self-limitations on personal 
freedom in using his property is a direct way of showing his readiness to bear in his 
mind the importance of having the other-regarding virtue. in doing so, one also shows 
that his engagement in other-regarding activities by no means runs counter to his own 
personal interests. rather, he thinks that they have intrinsic value to his self-worth 
and the development of his social membership. in this regard, frederick neuhouser 
insightfully observes: 
socially free individuals are said to regard their social membership as fundamental 
to their own ‘worth and dignity’ and to be motivated to fulfill their roles not out of 
consideration of ‘advantage’ but because ‘they have their dignity’ in doing so. by 
performing their social roles, and performing them well, they secure the esteem 
of others and ultimately their self-esteem as well. they achieve, in other words, 
the recognition of their fellow social members and thereby satisfy an aspiration that 
hegel … regards as fundamental to being a self, namely, the aspiration to be 
‘someone’, to count as a being of value both for oneself and for others.88
iv. social institutions, ProPerty rights, anD ethical Duties
the preceding two sections delved into the role of property in promoting personal free-
dom and social membership which are interconstitutive in nature. the remaining ques-
tion is how hegel would design the building blocks of the property system so as to tap 
into the power of property in promoting human individuality and sociability. in this sec-
tion, i aim to address this question by mapping out the landscape of the property system 
in ethical life that is envisaged by hegel. since human beings partake of the concrete 
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identity as social members, the nature of property rights in ethical life sharply differs 
from that in the stage of personal freedom. on the one hand, there are social institutions 
created to protect property rights. on the other hand, social institutions impose ethical 
duties on property owners. therefore, the actualization of property rights in the social 
world consists in the combination of rights and duties that are mediated by social insti-
tutions aimed at dealing with the vicissitudes of human interactions.
A. Protecting Property Rights 
for hegel, social institutions are to be constructed with, among other things, ad-
equate safeguards to protect the personal freedom of people in the social whole. for 
example, hegel points out that ‘in ethical life as a whole, both objective and subjec-
tive moments are present, but these are merely its forms. its substance is the good, 
that is, the fulfillment of the objective [united] with subjectivity’.89 hegel emphasizes 
the importance of fulfilling personal freedom in ethical life, because he is fully aware 
that the development of personal freedom must be sufficiently guaranteed for every 
individual to promote their social membership. in other words, giving considerable 
room for an individual to develop his personal freedom or individuality is inextricably 
intertwined with the shaping of his sociality. in the absence of personal freedom, the 
machinery of ethical life would lack the very dynamics of making individuals the con-
stituents of the social whole. take the state as an example. While the state represents 
the highest stage of development in ethical life, the forming of rational ethical order 
in the state consists in citizens’ self-development and their subsequent participation in 
cultural and political life. ‘the state is the actuality of concrete freedom. but concrete 
freedom requires that personal individuality and its particular interests should reach 
their full development and gain recognition of  their right for itself ’.90 also, hegel points out 
that the end of the state as the actuality of concrete freedom is to achieve ‘the happi-
ness of the citizens’.91
moreover, hegel specifies the concrete arrangements of social institutions aimed at 
protecting private rights. first and the foremost, the constitution represents the foun-
dation of the state and the pillar of the rational state order.92 it must be designed in a 
manner conducive to the promotion and protection of personal freedom. ‘the constitu-
tion of a nation must embody the nation’s feeling for its rights and [present] condition’.93 
While hegel does not explicitly discuss whether the constitution needs to contain a 
clause governing the constitutional protection of property, it is crystal clear that the con-
stitution in general should provide adequate institutional protection of property. this is 
because hegel regards property as the most fundamental right vested in human beings. 
as shown in the preceding two sections of this paper, property lays the foundation for 
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individuals to achieve their personal freedom and further promote their social member-
ship in ethical life. for example, hegel thinks that the success of any economic transac-
tions with contractual relationships lies in the precondition that the parties concerned 
have properties in their exclusive control.94
the constitution, according to hegel, determines the separation of state powers 
generally into three parts: legislative power, executive power, and the power of the sov-
ereign.95 With respect to the legislative power, it is regarded as the supreme power of the 
state.96 laws are enacted by the state as a means of specifying the ethical substance and 
governing the operation of the social whole.97 they determine, among other things, ‘the 
benefits which the state enables individuals to enjoy’.98 to this end, laws are generally 
promulgated to protect citizens’ civil rights. therefore, the enactment of civil rights–
based laws is the basic means of providing security and stability of property protection. 
moreover, hegel thinks law generally has three functions: 
laws express the determination of the content of objective freedom. first, for 
the immediate subject, for his independence willfulness and particular interest, 
they are restrictions. but secondly they are an absolute final end and the universal 
work: hence they are produced by the functions of the various estates, which distill 
themselves more and more out of the universal particularization, and by all the 
activity and private concerns of individuals. thirdly, laws are the substance of 
individuals’ free willing within their bounds and of their disposition and so are 
displayed as prevailing custom.99 
first of all, laws enacted by the state, according to the above passage, impose restric-
tions on personal freedom of action. With respect to property protection, persons 
as individual property owners as well as social members must obey laws to respect 
others’ property rights. trespassing or any unauthorized use of others’ property is 
generally prohibited by laws. secondly, hegel shows that one’s acquiescence in laws 
as a means of respecting others’ property rights is in fact the ‘universal work’ every 
citizen of the state must engage in. according to hegel, the infringement of property 
causes harm not only to an individual property owner but also to the common good 
as well. ‘since property and personality have legal recognition and validity in civil 
society, crime is no longer an injury merely to a subjective infinite, but to the universal 
cause whose existence is inherently stable and strong. this gives rise to the viewpoint 
that an action may be a danger to society’.100 those who commit infringements of 
property, therefore, are routinely denounced and penalized by law. thirdly, laws are 
largely reflective of the prevailing customs in a society that guide the ‘general mode 
     94. Pr§71 (‘contract presupposes that the contracting parties recognize each other as persons and owners 
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of behavior’.101 therefore, they embody the safeguards aimed at providing consider-
able room to accommodate the widely accepted ways of using property. not surpris-
ingly, hegel staunchly champions the codification of laws primarily on the grounds 
that legal codes provide stability and predictability to legal protection of civil rights, 
including property.102
With respect to the executive power, hegel takes the position that it should be fur-
ther divided into administrative power and the judicial power.103 for the former power, 
he emphasizes that ‘the business of administrators is to look after the private property 
and interests of these particular spheres, and in this respect, their authority is based in 
part on the trust of their fellow-citizens and equals’.104 regarding the judicial power, 
courts implement laws and are instrumental in actualizing civil rights. they mediate 
conflicts of private interests and penalize infringements of property based on the legal 
norms. by combining the legislative and judicial powers, hegel concludes, ‘infringements 
of property or personality are annulled’.105  
B. Enforcing Ethical Duties 
While individuals are entitled to adequate legal protection of their property rights, ethi-
cal duties are also imposed on them so as to require them to take actions to promote the 
well-being of their follow members in ethical life and to support the social institutions that 
provide protection of their rights. hegel’s justification for imposing duties on individuals as 
social members is derived from the intersubjective nature of the human relationships that 
are established among them. given their social membership, individuals are interlocked 
in different types of human relationships in the fabric of ethical life. each individual as a 
social member, in hegel’s view, is empowered to accomplish the pursuit of their ends by 
their fellow members, with whom they form the social whole in ethical life:
[h]e cannot accomplish the full extent of his ends without reference to others; 
these others are therefore means to the end of the particular [person]. but through 
its reference to others, the particular end takes on the form of universality, and 
gains satisfaction by simultaneously satisfying the welfare of others. since 
particularity is tied to the condition of universality, the whole … is the sphere of 
mediation in which all individual characteristics, all aptitudes, and all accidents 
of birth and fortune are liberated, and where the waves of all passions surge forth, 
governed only by the reason which shines through them.106 … the selfish ends in 
its actualization, conditioned in this way by universality, establishes a system of all-
     101. Pr §151.
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round interdependence, so that the subsistence and welfare of the individual and 
rightful existence are interwoven with, and grounded on, the subsistence, welfare, 
and rights of all, and have actuality and security only in this context.107
being embedded into the human relationships of interdependence, individuals there-
fore cannot act merely on their natural desires, preferences, or inclinations. such self-re-
garding sentiments must be appropriately limited. the creation of self-limitation meas-
ures provides individuals with the social experience of learning the ways in which they 
can limit their personal freedom of action. by going through such experiences, individu-
als cultivate the other-regarding virtue and the thinking capabilities of sorting out what 
leads to rectitude. in this sense, one’s learning how to limit personal freedom is central 
to the rationalization of his mind and his development of social membership in ethical 
life.108 ‘Without having experienced the discipline that breaks self-will, no one becomes 
free, rational, and capable of command’.109
therefore, hegel infers that ‘the relations of the individual in the relationships 
to which the substance particularizes itself constitute his ethical duties’.110 the ethical 
duties imposed on individuals are conceived of as ‘duties of relationships’111 moreover, 
he points out that a person’s rights and duties are correlatives rather than opposites: 
‘duty and right coincide in [the] identity of the universal and the particular will, and 
in the ethical realm, a human being has rights in so far as he has duties, and duties in 
so far as he has rights’.112
for hegel, ethical duties as the limitations on personal freedom do not put any 
burden on individuals. rather, acting as social members, individuals achieve liberation 
and promote their own well-being through fulfilling their ethical duties.113 ‘Particularity, 
limited by universality, is the only standard by which each particular [person] promotes 
his welfare’.114 this is because through fulfilling ethical duties, as shown above, one gains 
independence from the natural desires, preferences, and inclinations, and rationalizes 
himself through the social experience of engaging in other-regarding activities. on the 
other hand, one attains the ‘objective determinacy of action’115 and saves himself from 
getting lost in the search for guidance in the universe of ethical life. for hegel, ethical 
duties are reflective of the rational action that social members need to perform regard-
ing the substance of ethical life which lays the foundation for the written laws, customs, 
and traditions in a society. 
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With respect to property, hegel discusses the basis for imposing ethical duties on 
property owners. for hegel, property owners are deeply rooted in social web of human 
relationships, and therefore have duties to carry out other-regarding activities:
apart from crimes which the universal authority must prevent or bring to justice—
i.e., contingency in the shape of arbitrary evil—the permissible arbitrariness 
of inherently rightful actions and of the private use of property also has external 
relations with other individuals, as well as with other public arrangements designed 
to further a common end. through this universal aspect, private actions become a 
contingent matter which passes out of  my control and which can wrong or harm other 
people or actually does so.116 
this view of property-related social relationships has two dimensions. on the one hand, 
property owners have ‘external relations’ with other people. this means that the pri-
vate use of property can produce either positive or negative externalities on others. if a 
wealthy businessman holds a charity benefit every year in his house or simply donates 
some portions of his assets, many poor people may benefit from his generosity. but if a 
person plays loud music at midnight, he will impair his neighbors’ sleep and rest. on the 
other hand, property owners are, to a greater or lesser degree, related to the public poli-
cies aimed at promoting and protecting the common good. a factory that discharges a 
large amount of pollution will cause environmental damage in the region where it is lo-
cated; a residential community that is designed to be racially exclusive will run counter 
to the principle of racial equality. these enterprises, albeit privately owned and man-
aged, obviously have some bearing on the public policies aimed at improving environ-
mental protection or racial equality. therefore, the fact that property owners as social 
members are constantly engaged in human relationships results in the imposition of 
different degrees of ethical duties on private use of property. for example, with respect 
to the ethical duties in the stage of civil society, hegel observes that ‘the individual be-
comes a son of civil society, which has many claims upon him as he has rights in relation 
to it… . civil society must protect its members and defend their rights, just as the indi-
vidual owes a duty to the rights of civil society’.117 hence, the life cycle of property rights 
protected by social institutions is incomplete without the accompaniment of the duties 
imposed on property owners. rights and duties are constitutive of the property system 
and are deeply ingrained in a broad range of social settings. 
hegel does not provide a specific and exhaustive list of ethical duties that ought to 
be imposed upon property owners, and his discussions of these duties are scattered in 
different parts of the account of ethical life he presents in the Philosophy of  Right. in the 
domain of the family, for example, parents have the duty to physically support other 
family members and to nurture their children by capitalizing on their proprietary re-
sources. generally, they have the duty to rear children, cultivate them domestically, and 
send them to schools for education.118 
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in civil society, individuals have freedom to pursue their own life plans and satisfy 
their own needs. they bring this to fruition largely by relying on their own resources. 
the private use of property, therefore, becomes crucial to realizing individual life plans 
and satisfying individual needs. in this context, everyone has an equal status to pursue 
their life plans and cannot be arbitrarily interfered with by others. this type of equal 
status is socially determined, as everyone must be universally aware of the equality of 
personal freedom of enjoying property rights. yet private use of property as the means 
of satisfying individual needs, to a greater or lesser degree, still carries a social character. 
hegel explains this point as follows:
needs and means, as existing in reality, becomes a being for others by whose needs 
and work their satisfaction is mutually conditioned. that abstraction which 
becomes a quality of both needs and means also becomes a determination of 
the mutual relations between individuals. this universality, as the quality of  being 
recognized, is the moment which makes isolated and abstract needs, means, and 
modes of satisfaction into concrete, i.e. social ones.119
therefore, the individual use of property generally has two characteristics: it is private 
while also being social. being private means that an individual can use his property for 
self-regarding purposes. yet the social character requires that an individual should be 
mindful that his private use of property has external effects on others. therefore, a suf-
ficient degree of other-regarding requirements must be incorporated into the conduct 
code for property owners. they must use their properties in a manner not harmful to 
others’ enjoyment of their own properties.120  for instance, one cannot play loud music 
at midnight to disturb his neighbors’ sleeping in their own rooms.
in the sphere of the state, ethical duties imposed on property owners have intrinsic 
value to the promotion of their citizenship. hegel observes that ‘the individual, whose 
duties give him the status of a subject, finds that, in fulfilling his duties as a citizen, he 
gains protection for his particular welfare, satisfaction of his substantial essence, and 
the consciousness and self-awareness of being a member of a whole’.121 based upon this 
proposition, hegel spells out a few circumstances under which the citizens as property 
owners should be bound by ethical duties. for example, he thinks that speakers as the 
owners of their speech have the duty to restrain their freedom of expression in cer-
tain circumstances. freedom of expression enjoys a high level protection by the hege-
lian state. this is because speech, according to hegel, is deemed to be the property of 
speakers.122 yet it does not necessarily follow that every citizen is at liberty to say and 
write whatever he wishes to. absolute freedom of expression, in hegel’s view, is hollow 
in nature and doomed to undermine the intrinsic value of a free society. for example, 
     119. Pr §192.
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he expressly concludes that ‘to define freedom of the press as freedom to say and write 
whatever one pleases is equivalent to declaring that freedom in general means freedom 
to do whatever one pleases. such talk is the product of completely uneducated, crude, 
and superficial thinking’.123 
moreover, citizens have the duty to pay taxes as a way to fulfill their state service 
requirement.124 they pay taxes by using their own property. besides, hegel discusses the 
duty of property owners in the circumstance of a state emergency. he holds that individ-
ual interest becomes subordinate to national interest in such circumstances. as citizens, 
property owners have a ‘substantial duty … to preserve … the independence and sover-
eignty of the state—even if their own life and property, as well as their opinions and all 
that naturally falls within the province of life, are endangered or sacrificed’.125 
social institutions maintained by the state play an important role in enforcing the 
ethical duties imposed on property owners. While law provides legal protection of prop-
erty, it also sets out the limitations on personal freedom. as hegel observes, ‘every genu-
ine law is a freedom, for it involves a rational determination of objective mind, and so a 
content of freedom. by contrast, nothing has become more common than the idea that 
each of use must restrict our freedom in relation to the freedom of others, and the state 
is the condition in which this reciprocal restriction occurs, and the laws are the restric-
tions’.126 ethical duties imposed on property owners, as shown above, are in fact restric-
tions on personal freedom. therefore, the spirit and letter of law should aim to enforce 
the ethical duties imposed on property owners. also, courts as the institutions that en-
force law play an important role in enforcing such ethical duties. on the other hand, 
administrators are charged with the responsibility to deal with the conflict of private in-
terests, in particular those that are concerned with the community interest.127 acting as 
the police, some of the administrators are in charge of regulating private uses of prop-
erty that will potentially cause negative externalities on the well-being of others or the 
community at large.128 Put differently, the state has the police power to put private uses 
of property under its oversight to the extent that such power is exercised to protect ‘the 
safety, health, or morals of the community’.129
conclusion
the conventional interpretations of hegel’s property theory, as this paper shows, focus 
narrowly on the person-to-thing relationship and the role of property in developing 
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human individuality. in this way, they fail to situate their interpretations in the larger 
picture of hegel’s social theory of freedom, which leads to their inability to reconcile the 
individualistic aspects of property with hegel’s non-individualistic ideas of ethical life in 
particular. this is the core problem inherent in the conventional interpretations of he-
gel’s theory of property.
in fact, hegel’s theory of property is aimed at tapping into the power of property to 
foster and promote both human individuality and sociality. the building blocks of social 
institutions in the hegelian state act as the indispensable catalyst for engineering the 
power of property to make personal freedom and social membership interconditioned 
and interconstitutive. 
Property, in hegel’s view, constitutes the external sphere in which a person devel-
ops his personal freedom and individuality. in doing so, it further facilitates mutual rec-
ognition of personal freedom among persons as property owners. on the other hand, 
property plays a pivotal role in transforming individuals into social members. in doing 
so, it promotes the well-being of social members and facilitates social recognition of con-
crete identities taken on by social members. moreover, the power of property in shaping 
human individuality and sociality is indispensably supported by social institutions that 
function to protect property rights and enforce ethical duties. in the realm of property, 
hegel leads us to understand that proprietary control over an external sphere necessar-
ily entails both a person-to-thing relation and person-to-person relations. 
hegel’s social theory of property shows how his idea of freedom as ‘living with one-
self in an other’ could be actualized in the social world. as he demonstrates, there is 
always an other in the freedom sustained and enhanced by the fabric of property rela-
tions: persons with things, persons with persons, social members with things, and social 
members with social members. it is the very otherness embedded into the property that 
makes the journey to the social world fruitful, exciting, and dynamic. this is because 
the journey opens a myriad of opportunities for human beings to achieve self-recogni-
tion, self-actualization, and self-transformation in social settings. the very immanence 
of the otherness, as hegel imaginatively shows, makes us the masters of the self and at 
home in the social world.
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